Informed consent has become one of the central problems in medical ethics. At first sight, it would seem that no argument can be made against a person's right to be fully aware of the extent, course, and implications of his medical condition. It seems equally obvious that it is the patient's right to participate in, influence, or fully and solely assume the decisions of medical actions that should be undertaken or withheld with regard to his disease. 1 Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which these commonly held assumptions about a patient's rights may not apply. It is the purpose of this report to describe a case where informed consent was deliberately not sought, and to discuss the ethical issues involved.
Case report A 56-year-old man was referred to an orbital tumour clinic because of progressive protrusion of one eyeball. This man worked as a farm labourer in a rural area of an under-developed country. He was the father of five children, and his monthly income was approximately equivalent to £20.00 (40 US dollars).
The patient's medical history was unremarkable, except that he never had any useful vision in his left eye, due to an uncorrected squint which he had had for quite some time. His present complaint consisted of progressive out and forward displacement of his right eye, with accompanying dull, but not intense, pain of the orbital region, and some loss of vision.
On ophthalmologic examination, a tumour was found, which displaced the right globe and decreased visual acuity to 0.4. The left eye was deviated and amblyopic, with vision of counting fingers.
After a complete medical examination, which was normal, the patient was operated on, and two large, well-encapsulated tumours were removed from his right orbit. On histopathology, the growth was labelled an adenocarcinoma of the lacrimal gland. Although the pathologist was confident of her diagnosis, she expressed some doubts as to its certainty. Nevertheless, she advised the currently recommended treatment of exenteration of the orbit, that is, complete removal of the eye and orbital contents. 2 The attending physician did not follow the 
Withholding information
The patient was not told that the malignant tumours removed from his orbit were, in all probability, of a nature whereby cancerous cells have remained in the orbit or were spread through the bloodstream; that large series of patients with adenocarcinoma of the lacrimal gland report no patient to be alive and free of recurrences and/or metastases, regardless of whether the tumour was cut out or the contents of the orbit remained. In other words, the patient was not informed that he had a fatal, incurable disease.
The decision to withhold information was based on a set of premises derived from the specific patient involved, the nature of the disease, and, certainly, a biased attitude of the physician.
The pathologist, although confident, was not absolutely certain of her diagnosis, nor of the prognosis, in view of the unusually well-developed fibrous encapsulation of the tumour. Therefore, the patient would receive information, and be required to make decisions, on the basis of a high probability, not a certainty. Informed consent Because the patient was not advised of the implications of his illness, informed consent was not possible. The decision made by the physician and not shared with the patient had been reduced from two options: concurring with the current recommendation of exenterating the orbit, which would mean iatrogenically blinding the patient in an attempt to postpone or eliminate death through tumour excision, or leaving the patient with his eye intact and the almost certainty of tumourinduced death. The patient therefore was not given the choice between blindness with probable death and conserved vision with almost certain death. In this alternative pair, the difference between 'probable' and 'certain' death is statistically insignificant.
The decision to bypass informed consent of the patient in the management of his case was based on two considerations: The options to be offered were equally discouraging (elective blindness and possible death vs. retainedvisionandpossible death) and medical experience was clearly confused as to the current management of these cases (vide infra); the physician had little in the way of informed arguments to help the patient decide between two similarly cruel alternatives.
Current therapeutic recommendations
In spite of the pathologist's insistence, the physician did not offer the patient the possibility of an exenteration. Here, the decision encompassed considerations offered by the medical literature.
'If the neoplasma is not too large and exenteration has not been deferred too long, rarely a patient may escape the inevitable fate that most must face'.2 'Not only is the mortality [of orbital adenocarcinoma] high but also the patient may suffer long periods of continuous pain before exhaustion brings about an end to the uneven tussle. Furthermore, in the interval between discovery of the tumour and death, the patient usually is subjected to several radical surgical procedures in an attempt to circumvent the tumour. Also, high doses of radiation may add a burden of malaise to an already miserable patient'.2 'If future surveys ... confirm the apparent futility of present treatment methods we will have to revise our recommendations for a radical surgical approach'.2 In other words, the decision to be made balanced radical, painful, and in all probability futile treatment, in this particular case aggravated by sudden and optionally chosen blindness, against passive observation and the knowledge that the final outcome would be equally fatal as with treatment.
The decision to withhold radical treatment was based on doubts about the certainty of the diagnosis, scepticism about the advantages of radical treatment, the particular problem of avoiding blindness in this patient, and the general consideration that restrained treatment was a reversible attitude, whereas exenteration of the orbit implied blindness, pain, and a probability of later recognition that aggressive treatment had been unnecessary (if the histopathologic diagnosis were ever revised) or futile.
In conclusion, this case confronts the physician with the unusual circumstance of choosing to present his patient with two equally hopeless alternatives. Their hopelessness was considered to be sufficient ground to withhold information and to bypass consent for no further treatment. The physician elected to adopt a paternalistic, rather than contractual relationship with his patient. 3 The two-year favourable follow-up of the patient is certainly satisfying, but can in no way be considered as an argument in favour of the original decision. 
